KLK215: Assessing the Security and Survivability of Transportation Control Networks

Principal Investigators:

Paul Oman and Axel Krings

Project Objectives:

The five specific objectives of the research project are to

• Determine the similarities between transportation control networks and other real-time complex control systems, such as the electric power grid,
• Assess the state-of-the-practice with respect to the application of Information Security (InfoSec) principles within existing traffic and transportation control networks,
• Adapt or develop procedures for Common Mode Failure Analysis (CMFA) and Security/Survivability Systems Analysis (S/SSA) from the electric power domain to application within traffic/transportation control networks,
• Identify areas within transportation control networks where existing InfoSec technologies can be applied, but are heretofore absent, and
• Identify transportation domain specific vulnerabilities for which new InfoSec technologies and devices must be developed or adapted.

Task Descriptions:

Task 1.: Analysis of existing transportation control networks through visitations, literature review, and meetings with NIATT and ITD.

Task 2.: In situ security and survivability assessments of actual control center and dispatch operations.

Task 3.: Fault and failure analyses by trial application of CMFA and S/SSA procedures to documented failure incidents and/or transportation network topological diagrams.

Task 4.: Adaptation of CMFA and S/SSA procedures to accommodate domain specific characteristics of transportation control networks.

Task 5.: Gap analysis documenting InfoSec applications and voids within transportation control network topologies.

Milestones:

Budget Information:

UTC funds dedicated to this project are $32,699.

Student Involvement:

Carol Taylor, Computer Science Ph.D., funded by NIST grant #60NANB1D0116.

Daniel Conte de Leon, Computer Science M.S., funded by NIST grant #60NANB1D0116.

Robert Morris, Computer Science Ph.D., funded by the Computer Science Department.

1 Computer Science graduate student

1 or 2 computer science or transportation undergraduate students

Relationship to the NIATT Strategic Plan and to Other Research Projects:

This proposal specifically addresses the security and survivability of a real-time control network supporting an advanced Center for Traffic Operations and Control, as described in NIATT’s Strategic Plan. Complex systems like traffic control and transportation monitoring networks form the heart of our nation’s critical infrastructures, without which our nation’s commerce and economy would collapse.

Technologies exist for convenient access and intelligent control of remote devices, but that convenience and remote operations capability comes at the cost of reduced security and survivability. It is now apparent that our nation’s infrastructures and essential utilities are susceptible to cascading failures induced by relatively minor events, such weather phenomena, accidental damage to system components, and physical or cyber attack. In contrast, survivable complex control structures should and could be designed to lose sizable portions of the system and still maintain essential control functions.

The principle investigators have embarked on a two-year project, funded by NIST, to improve the security and survivability of the electric power grid. This work will apply those same experimental procedures to the control network of our transportation grid. The Computer Science Department’s NSF Cyber Service Fellowship grant assists with this effort by providing stipends to students whose work is focused on computer and network security issues. Possible sources of future funding include follow-up studies funded by NIST, basic research in InfoSec funded by NSA, and applications of control system security and survivability principles funded by the new Office of Homeland Security.

Technology Transfer Activities:

Technologies generated by this project that have the potential for commercialization and/or institutionalization include

• Traffic/Transportation control network security checklists and procedures,
• Traffic/Transportation control network survivability maps and procedures,
• Vulnerability and mitigation matrices, relative to traffic and transportation control networks,
• CMFA and S/SSA procedures applicable to traffic and transportation control systems, and
• Results from InfoSec gap analyses conducted on traffic and transportation control systems.

Institutionalization of the traffic/transportation-centric checklists, maps, and procedures could only be implemented through a recognized state or local organization such as NIATT or the Idaho Transportation Department. However, the vulnerability analyses, CMFA, and S/SSA procedures are of interest to a wide group of organizations and entities, including NIST, INEEL, PNNL, NSA, and the new Office of Homeland Security. Further, commercial potential of new technologies identified through gap analyses would be of interest to all those organizations, plus all businesses involved in manufacturing control systems (e.g., Honeywell, GE, Siemens, SEL, etc.). All results and deliverables from the proposed project will be documented in technical reports and publications sufficient to recreate the procedures and artifacts. Commercialization and institutionalization of results will be coordinated through NIATT unless NIST has prior claim to those results.

Potential Benefits of the Project:

Our modern digital society’s critical infrastructures are complex control systems with interdependencies and fragilities beyond common expectations. The roots of these characteristics lie in the relatively benign, but fast-paced development environment in which our digital society has developed. In short, our non-military infrastructures were not designed for hostile environments, nor did they evolve under the hostile conditions experienced by many nations under constant bombardment by warfare, internal strife, and terrorism. As such, our computerized control systems contain many potentials for common mode failures, including physical components, hardware circuitry, firmware, and software.

We must, however, begin to harden our critical infrastructures against those very attacks. The hardening process—against both physical and cyber attack—begins by modeling security and survivability characteristics within complex systems. We have already applied fault modeling and security/survivability assessment procedures to the electric power grid. We are convinced that these same procedures are applicable to all real-time, complex control systems, including transportation control networks. The resulting benefit will be mitigation strategies and design parameters for more robust and survivable systems for advanced traffic operations and control.

Project status:

Complete

Final Report:

N05-01 (pdf)